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1. Introduction
In this paper we consider a model where rational agents have the option to carry out
sabotage activities. Traditionally, sabotage has been associated with capitalism -at least
since the days of the Luddite revolt- and/or with envy (see Mui [1995]). In this paper we
show that sabotage can arise as a rational action under cooperative production, where
output is entirely distributed to workers. An example of how sabotage may arise in this
framework follows.
Two people are collecting grapes. Andy collects white grapes -whose quantity is
denoted by R1  and Beth collects red grapes, whose quantity is denoted by R2. These
grapes are transformed into wine -denoted by X  according to the production func-
tion X = (R1 + R2)1=2. The quantity of wine allocated to each worker -C1 and C2
respectively- is given by the Proportional Sharing Rule, i.e.
Ci =
Ri
R1 +R2
(R1 +R2)
1=2; i = 1; 2:
For future reference we notice that this sharing rule is meritocratic, in the sense that it
allocates wine depending on relative inputs. Suppose that when an unexpected event
forces Beth to leave, R1 = R2 = 50: Thus, X = 10, C1 = C2 = 5. Choices for Andy are
to remain faithfully devoted to collecting grapes, in which case he would obtain,say, 21
extra units or to destroy the crop assembled by Beth and pretend that somebody stole
it.1 In the rst case his consumption of wine is
C1 =
71
121
(121)1=2 ' 6; 45:
In the second case, Andys consumption of wine is
C1 =
50
50
(50)1=2 ' 7; 07:
1Andy can explain that his output is just 50 by saying that he spent the remaining time chasing the
thief.
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Therefore, if Andy is rational and only cares about his wine consumption, he will destroy
Beths crop. Suppose now that the sharing rule is Egalitarian, i.e.
Ci =
(R1 +R2)
1=2
2
; i = 1; 2:
We notice that this rule is not meritocratic at all, in the sense that it allocates wine
irrespective of relative inputs. In this case, faithful work yields to Andy C1 = 5:5 and
sabotage C1 = 3:5, i.e. sabotage is not a rational action.
What is going on in this example? When an agent decides to sabotage there are two
e¤ects. On the one hand, output falls reecting the decrease in the quantity of input
supplied by both the saboteur and the agent who has been sabotaged. This is bad from
the saboteurs point of view because there is less to be distributed. We will call this
the Production E¤ect. Notice that the importance of this e¤ect depends on the returns
embodied in the production function. Since returns reect the degree of congestion
among inputs, the magnitude of the production e¤ect depends inversely on the degree
of congestion. On the other hand, the relative ranking of the saboteur rises and that is
good for him. We will call this the Distribution E¤ect. The importance of this e¤ect
depends on how meritocratic the sharing rule is; for instance in the egalitarian sharing
rule this e¤ect does not exist. When the rule is meritocratic and there is congestion,
the distribution e¤ect may dominate and sabotage is a rational action, as in the case of
the proportional sharing rule above.2
The model of cooperative production is presented in Section 2. In order to make
the model tractable we make a number of simplications. First we assume that the
total quantity of labor supplied by each agent is xed. Thus, labor can be spent on the
2A related example may help to further understand this relationship. Suppose that a group of
athletes are running in an event. Runners can devote their energies either to running or to stepping on
other people shoes, i.e. to sabotage. One would expect that the occurrence of sabotage depends on how
e¤orts translate into run/sabotage, how runners are rewarded -the more meritocratic the reward, the
more sabotage- and the degree of congestion i.e. if runners form a compact pack or they are scattered.
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production of an intermediate input (by exerting e¤ort) or on the destruction of the
inputs of other agents (sabotage). This assumption is made in order to focus attention
on the choice between productive and sabotage activities. It is appropriated when
length of working time is xed exogenously by law, custom, etc. Second, we assume
that the production function and the sharing rule are symmetric in inputs. However
the model is not symmetric because agents have di¤erent productivities.3 This paper
studies the existence and properties of Pareto E¢ cient Nash equilibria, which, under
our assumptions, is the Nash equilibrium with no sabotage.
In Section 3 we present a necessary condition for sabotage not to arise in a Nash
equilibrium that says that for each pair of agents, either the relative capability of sab-
otage with respect to productive activities is small relative to the relative productivity,
or, the degree of meritocracy should be bounded. This bound depends on the degree of
congestion, the relative productivity of agents, the relative capability of agents between
sabotage and productive activities and the complementarity or substitutability among
inputs. This result is recorded as Proposition 1. We also show how this condition can
be simplied because for a given agent, say i, the fulllment of the necessary condition
with respect to another agent, say j, implies the fulllment of the necessary condition
of i with respect to any agent less productive than j (Proposition 2). However, the ful-
llment of the necessary condition for some i does not imply the fulllment of necessary
conditions for any other agent, see Example 1. In our Example 2 we explore the role
of the di¤erent variables in the necessary condition in the case where the production
function is of the CES type and the sharing rule is a convex combination of the pro-
portional and the egalitarian sharing rules. An interesting implication of our analysis is
that, for more than two agents with di¤erent productivities, an increase in the degree
3Agents must be heterogeneous because with identical agents all sharing rules yield equal distribution
so the question of the distribution of the output, does not arise. Moreover, given that the egalitarian
sharing rule yields incentives not to sabotage, this sharing rule is preferrable to any other in this case.
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of complementarity among inputs decreases the level of meritocracy compatible with no
sabotage. In the limit (perfect complementarity), the unique sharing rule compatible
with no sabotage is the egalitarian sharing rule.
In Section 4 we study the existence of a Nash equilibrium with no sabotage. As it
happens with the necessary condition, we have two cases. When the capabilities of sab-
otage with respect to productive activities are small, no sabotage is a Nash equilibrium
(Proposition 3). Furthermore, when these relative capabilities are su¢ ciently small,
zero sabotage is the unique Nash equilibrium (Proposition 4). However, when these ca-
pabilities are not small we need an extra assumption that is stronger -but with the same
avor- than the necessary condition in order to guarantee that no sabotage is a Nash
equilibrium (Proposition 5). Example 3 shows the necessity of this new assumption.4
Finally, Section 5 comments our assumptions and suggests further research.
Let us now comment on other papers dealing with sabotage. As far as we know
Nalebu¤ and Stiglitz (1983) were the rst to acknowledge that In the competitive
system.... there are... rewards from engaging in destructive activity (id. p. 40).5
If saboteurs are identical, we have the following contributions. In the case of a prot
maximizing rm, Lazear (1989) showed that, if sabotage is possible, large di¤erences in
salaries become dysfunctional. In his model, agents are paid according to the position
achieved in a contest.6 Auriol, Friebel and Pechlivanos, (1999) considered a Principal-
4Our results contrast with Holmstrom (1982) where e¢ ciency can not be achieved. There are several
di¤erences between our model and Holmstroms, the most important being that in our model agents
produce an intermediate input that is contractible. As has been shown by Nandeibam (2002) in a model
where sabotage is not possible, e¢ ciency might arise in equilibrium if there are contractible intermediate
inputs. Thus, our results and Nandeibams show the importance of contractible intermediate inputs.
5 Itoh (1991) and Macho-Stadler and Pérez-Castrillo (1993) analyze the polar case where cooperation
among agents is possible.
6When some aspects of performance are rewarded but others are not, other types of dysfunctional
behavior are possible, see Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991). This literature is surveyed in Gibbons (1998)
and Prendergast (1999).
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Agent model where the former can not commit so she has to o¤er collectively oriented
incentive schemes in order to avoid sabotage. Konrad (2000) considered a model of
Rent-Seeking where the e¤ort of an agent reduces rival´s performance by sabotaging
her activities. He shows that, in equilibrium, sabotage disappears if the number of
agents is su¢ ciently large. Heterogeneous agents have been considered by three di¤erent
strands of literature: Experimental (Harbring, Irlenbusch, Krakël, and Selten [2004] and
Harbring and Irlenbusch [2005]), Management (Chen [2003] and Yumoto [2003]) and
Political economy (Skaperdas and Grofman [1995]). All these papers identify conditions
under which some of the agents are more likely to engage and/or to receive sabotage.7
However, none of these papers deals with the main focus of our paper which is to identify
conditions on the sharing rule such that sabotage does not arise in equilibrium.
In all the models referenced above agents compete directly so the existence of sab-
otage is quite natural. In a model of cooperative production where agents at the same
time compete (the distribution e¤ect) and cooperate (the production e¤ect) things are
more involved. In our model the possibility of sabotage depends on: (1) The degree
of meritocracy (as in prot-maximizing rms), (2) the relative productivity of agents
(under identical agents the relative productivity of an agent is just one divided by the
number of agents, hence the role of the later in rent-seeking models), (3) the relative
capability of agents between sabotage and productive activities, (4) the relationship
among inputs (complementarity or substitutability) and (5) the degree of congestion.
Thus, our analysis of the necessary and su¢ cient conditions for absence of sabotage pro-
duces a picture where all the causes of sabotage considered before have a role and new
causes emerge, i.e. points (4) and (5) above which are associated with the technology
of the rm.
7For instance Skaperdas and Grofman (1995) considered a model in which candidates may focus the
campaign on positive or negative aspects, the role of the latter being similar to sabotage. They showed
that in equilibrium the leading candidate is less likely to engage in negative campaigning.
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2. The Model
The setting is one of cooperative production, see, e.g., Sen (1966), Fabella (1988) and
Roemer and Silvestre (1993) for examples and applications. There are n agents. The
input provided by agent i is denoted by Ri 2 R+: LetX be total output. The production
function is written f(R1; ::; Rn) = F (
Pn
k=1  (Rk)):We will assume that f is C1, concave,
strictly increasing in all its arguments and  is homogeneous of degree  2 R with
  1:This form generalizes the well known CES form. Total output is shared among
agents by means of a sharing rule, i.e. a list of functions si : Rn+ ! [0; 1]; i = 1; ::::; n such
that
Pn
i=1 si(R1; ::; Rn) = 1 for all (R1; ::; Rn) 2 Rn+. We assume that for all i 2 f1; ::; ng;
si(R1; ::; Rn) = s(Ri;
P
k 6=iRk); where s() is a C1 function, non decreasing on Ri; non
increasing in
P
k 6=iRk; homogeneous of degree cero, and such that s(Ri;
P
k 6=iRk) > 0 if
Ri > 0. The homogeneity assumption ensures that shares do not depend on how inputs
are measured. An example of a class of sharing rules fullling these conditions is:
si(R1; ::; Rn) =
RiPn
k=1Rk
+
1  
n
;  2 [0; 1]; i = 1; :::; n: (2.1)
This family of sharing rules is parametrized by : If  = 0 we get the egalitarian
sharing rule and if  = 1; we have the proportional sharing rule. The parameter  is
a measure of how relative e¤ort is valued and thus measures the degree of meritocracy.
The interested reader can nd in Moulin (1987) and Pngsten (1991) other examples of
sharing rules fullling our conditions.
Agents care only about their own consumption. As we remarked in the Introduction,
the quantity of labor time is xed. An agent, say i, can divide her working time,
denoted by T; between productive labor, denoted by lPi and sabotage activities. Let
lij be the quantity of labor allocated by i to sabotage the input of agent j. The time
constraint reads T = lPi +
P
j 6=i lij : The input provided by agent i depends on her
own productive e¤ort, lPi ; the amount of time devoted by the remaining agents to
7
sabotaging the input of i and a parameter, i > 0, reecting the productivity of i:
Formally, Ri = iR(lPi ; l1i; :::l(i 1)i; l(i+1)i; :::lni) where R( ) is a C1 function such that
@R
@lPi
> 0 and
@R
@lji
< 0:
Without loss of generality we will assume that 1  :::  n. Given these elements, we
describe the sabotage game as follows: for each agent i, a strategy is the time devoted
to sabotage activities, i.e. the vector li = (li1; li2; li(i 1); li(i+1); lin): Time devoted to
productive activities is determined by the constraint lPi = T  
P
j 6=i lij : By l i we
denote the vector (l1; :::; li 1; li+1; ::; ln): For each agent i; given a vector of strategies
(li; l i); the payo¤ function is given by
i(li; l i)  si(R1(li; l i); :::; Rn(li; l i))f(R1(li; l i); :::; Rn(li; l i)) where
Rj(li; l i)  jR(T  
X
j 6=i
lji; l1j ; :::l(j 1)j ; l(j+1)j ; :::lnj); j = 1; :::; n:
A Nash equilibrium of the sabotage game, denoted by NE, is a vector of strategies
(l1; ::; ln) such that for all agent i; i(li; l i)  i(l0i; l i) for all l0i:
We postpone until Section 4 the problem of the existence of a NE. In Section 3
below we concentrate on the implications of the necessary condition guaranteeing that
no agent has incentives to engage in sabotage.
3. A Necessary Condition for No Sabotage
If all working time is devoted to productive activities, (li; l i) = (0; 0): Dene R0j 
jR(0; 0) for agent j; and let R0 denote the vector of inputs evaluated at the point of
zero sabotage, that is, R0 = (R01; :::; R
0
n): If no agent has incentive to sabotage when all
other agents do not sabotage, it must be that 8i; j; @i(0;0)@lij  0; where
@i(0; 0)
@lij
= f(R0)(
@si(R
0)
@Rj
@Rj(0; 0)
@lij
  @si(R
0)
@Ri
@Ri(0; 0)
@lPi
)
+si(R
0)(
@f(R0)
@Rj
@Rj(0; 0)
@lij
  @f(R
0)
@Ri
@Ri(0; 0)
@lPi
)
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If this requirement is not fullled, all NE imply sabotage. Let
Mij   
@Rj(0;0)
@lij
@Ri(0;0)
@lPi
=  
j
@R(0;0)
@lij
i
@R(0;0)
@lPi
:
Mij is a measure of the relative impact of change in inputs induced by an innitesimal
reallocation of is labor from productive to sabotage activities towards agent j evaluated
at the point of zero sabotage. Thus, Mij is a measure of the power of destruction versus
production capabilities. From our assumptions it follows that Mij > 0: Let
M   
@R(0;0)
@lij
@R(0;0)
@lPi
;
which is independent of i and j: Thus, we can write
Mij =
j
i
M:
By our assumptions on the production function,
@f(R0)
@Rj
=
@F (y0)
@y
 0(R0j ); where y 
nX
k=1
 (Rk):
Since  is homogeneous of degree ;  0(R0j ) = 
 1
j  
0(R(0; 0)): Thus,
@f(R0)
@Rj
=

j
i
 1 @f(R0)
@Ri
:
Using the denition of Mij and dividing by f(R0); the necessary condition reads
 @si(R
0)
@Rj
Mij   @si(R
0)
@Ri
+ si(R
0)
@f(R0)
@Ri
1
f(R0)
( 

j
i
 1
Mij   1)  0:
Or,
 @si(R
0)
@Rj

j
i

M   @si(R
0)
@Ri
+ si(R
0)
@f(R0)
@Ri
1
f(R0)
( 

j
i

M   1)  0:
Let z Pk 6=iRk: Because our assumptions on the sharing rules,
@si(R
0)
@Rj
=
@s(R0i ; z)
@z
;
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and since the sharing rule is homogenous of degree cero,
@s(R0i ; z)
@Ri
R0i +
@s(R0i ; z)
@z
z = 0:
Thus,
 @si(R
0)
@Rj
=
@si(R
0)
@Ri
R0iP
k 6=iR
0
k
=
@si(R
0)
@Ri
iP
k 6=i k
:
Using this relation, the rst order condition can be written as
(
jP
k 6=i k
M   1)@si(R
0)
@Ri
1
si(R0)
 @f(R
0)
@Ri
1
f(R0)
(

j
i

M + 1):
Multiplying by R0i ; the above inequality implies that
(
jP
k 6=i k
M   1)@si(R
0)
@Ri
R0i
si(R0)
 @f(R
0)
@Ri
R0i
f(R0)
(

j
i

M + 1): (3.1)
Now we have two cases. If M 
P
k 6=i k
j
, the inequality (3.1) always holds. However, if
M >
P
k 6=i k
j
;
@si(R
0)
@Ri
R0i
si(R0)
 @f(R
0)
@Ri
R0i
f(R0)

j
i

M + 1
0B@
P
k 6=i
k
jM  
P
k 6=i
k
1CA : (3.2)
Next Proposition summarizes our previous arguments:
Proposition 1. If zero sabotage is a Nash equilibrium of the sabotage game, then
either
1. The possibilities of destruction are small compared with the relative productivity of
all other agents, i.e., M 
P
k 6=i k

=j ; or
2. if M >
P
k 6=i k

=j ; in the point of zero sabotage, the elasticity of the share
with respect to the input of agent i is bounded by the elasticity of the production
function with respect to the input of agent i; multiplied by a factor that depends on the
possibilities of destruction and the relative productivity of agents (see (3.2) above).
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The elasticity of the share with respect to the input of agent i can be interpreted as
the degree of meritocracy because it measures how ones share responds to ones e¤orts.
The elasticity of the production function with respect to the input of agent i; can be
interpreted as the inverse degree of congestion because it measures how output responds
inputs. Thus Proposition 1 says that when the possibilities of destruction are not small
the degree of meritocracy is bounded above by a factor that depends on the degree of
congestion, the possibilities of destruction and the relative productivity of agents.
One might think that under reasonable circumstances, it will be possible to simplify
the necessary conditions, as it is done in Principal-Agent problems. We may hope that
the fulllment of the necessary condition for some i implies the fulllment of necessary
conditions for all agents. Or, we may hope that for a given agent, say i, the fulllment
of the necessary condition with respect to another agent, say j, implies the fulllment
of the necessary condition of i with respect to any agent less productive than j. Next
example shows that the rst hope is not warranted.
Example 1. Let n = 2; 1 = 1; 2 = 2; si(R1; R2) = RiRi+Rj +
1 
2 and choose R(:)
such that M = 2: The production function has constant elasticity of substitution, X =
(
P
(Ri)
)
r
 ; with   1 and r  1. The necessary condition for no sabotage reads:
4
3(3  ) 
r
2 + 1
(2+1 + 1) for agent 1 and
4
3(+ 3)
 r2

2 + 1

1
2
2 + 1

=
r(2 + 2)
2 + 1
for agent 2:
For  = 1; (inputs are perfect substitutes) these conditions read:
  15r
4 + 5r
and   3r
1  r :
The rst (resp. second) inequality holds trivially when r > 0:4 (resp. r > 0:25). We
see that 15r=(4 + 5r)  3r=(1   r) if and only if 0:1  r: Thus for r 2 (0:1; 0:25) the
fulllment of the rst inequality implies the fulllment of the second but for r 2 (0; 0:1)
is the other way around.
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The interpretation of this example is that if production is not very responsive to
inputs, i.e. r is small, sabotage comes from the most productive agent using her superior
capabilities to sabotage the other agent, given the scarce impact of her e¤orts on output.
When r becomes larger the comparative advantage of the most productive agent is to
devote all her time to production activities and he becomes the target of sabotage.
Fortunately, our second conjecture is valid.
Proposition 2. Given an agent i; if the inequality (3:2) holds for l, it holds for all j
such that j < l:
Proof. To prove this, it is enough to show that if j < l then

l
i

M + 1
0B@
P
k 6=i
k
lM  
P
k 6=i
k
1CA < j
i

M + 1
0B@
P
k 6=i
k
jM  
P
k 6=i
k
1CA ; (3.3)
which is equivalent to show that
(l   j) >

j
i

 

l
i
X
k 6=i
k  

l

j
i

  j

l
i

M: (3.4)
Since j < l;

l
j

is increasing in ; and since   1; it follows that lj 

l
j

,
thus,
l

j
i

  j

l
i

 0: (3.5)
And since M >
P
k 6=i k

=j ;
l

j
i

  j

l
i

M >

j
i

 

l
i
X
k 6=i
k; (3.6)
which implies that the right hand side of inequality (3.4) is negative while the left hand
side is positive. Thus, inequality (3.4) holds.
To conclude this section, the following example, which is a generalization of Example
1, highlights the role of the di¤erent variables in the condition (3.2):
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Example 2. Let us assume that: (i) The sharing rule has the form
RiPn
k=1Rk
+
1  
n
; with 0    1: (3.7)
(i) The production function is of CES type,
X =
 
nX
i=1
(Ri)

! r

with   1 and r  1: (3.8)
Under i) and ii) we have the following:
@si(R
0)
@Ri
R0i
si(R0)
=
i
P
k 6=i k
(
Pn
k=1 k)
2( iPn
k=1 k
+ 1 n )
; (3.9)
@f(R0)
@Ri
R0i
f(R0)
=
riPn
k=1 

k
: (3.10)
By Proposition 2 we can restrict our attention to the necessary condition for agent i
not to sabotage agent n: Thus, inequality (3.2) can be written as
 iPn
k=1 k
iPn
k=1 k
+ 1 n
 r(

nM + 

i )Pn
k=1 

k
0B@ Pnk=1 k
nM  
P
k 6=i
k
1CA : (3.11)
We now study the e¤ect of the variables in the two sides of (3.11): We see that the
e¤ects of M , and r are what we expect from intuition, i.e. an increase in M -the
relative power of destruction with respect to production- makes harder the fulllment
of (3.11) and an increase of r -the responsiveness of output with respect to inputs- makes
easier the fulllment of (3.11). But the e¤ects of  and s are complex, even though
some interpretation of what is going on is possible.
E¤ect of : To analyze the e¤ect of  assume rst that n > 2; and there are at least
an agent k such that k < n 1: Let us restrict our attention to inequality (3.11) for
i = n  1 and j = n: Notice that  only a¤ects the expression
r(nM + 

n 1)Pn
k=1 

k
: (3.12)
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This expression reects the e¤ect of sabotage from n   1 to n on output. It reects
the opportunity cost of sabotage. It can be shown that (3.12) is increasing in , and
it goes to zero when  goes to minus innity (perfect complementarity) (see Lemma
2 in the Appendix for details). Thus, in the limit, the unique level of meritocracy
compatible with no sabotage is  = 0 (even if we have constant returns to scale, r = 1):
The interpretation of this result is that when inputs approach perfect complementarity,
output depends only on the input provided by the least productive agent, so there are
incentives to sabotage any other agent because output will be una¤ected.
When n = 2 the situation is di¤erent, because a reduction in the input provided by
agent 1 -coming either from a sabotage of 2 into 1 or from the distraction of resources
implied by sabotage of agent 1- reduces production. As a consequence, sharing rules can
be more meritocratic when there are two agents only. Formally, the expression (3.12)
goes to r when !  1. So in the limit inequality (3.11) can be written as:
  r(1 + 2)
2
212(M   1) + r(22   21)
: (3.13)
It can be shown that the right hand side depends on the relative productivity of agents,
and is U-shaped with a unique minimum at 1=2 = (M   r   1) = (M + r   1). This
form reects the trade-o¤ of sabotage for agent 1: When agent 2 is very productive,
sabotage has no noticeable impact on the relative ranking so it is a waste of time. And
when both agents are almost identical, sabotage a¤ects output which is bad from the
saboteur interests. Thus meritocracy takes the highest possible value in one of the
extremes of 1=2.
E¤ect of s. It is di¢ cult to say something in general about the e¤ect of productivities
on (3.11). Let us simplify this inequality by assuming perfect substitution, i.e.  = 1.
Then, (3.11) reads
 iPn
k=1 k
iPn
k=1 k
+ 1 n
 r(jM + i)
jM  
P
k 6=i
k
: (3.14)
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- E¤ect of i : From the previous equation, we see that when i !1 the LHS of (3.14)
tends to one but the RHS tends to innite, thus the inequality holds. In this case,
the large productivity of i yields incentives to concentrate her activities in production
matters. Also when i ! 0 the LHS of (3.14) tends to zero but the RHS tends to
a positive number and thus (3.14) also holds. This is more intriguing but it can be
explained by noting that when i is close to 0, the distribution e¤ect, i.e. the change in
ishare measured here by the LHS of (3.14), is negligible so sabotage does not pays o¤.
Finally, it is clear that the necessary condition may not hold for intermediate values of
i where the interplay between the production and the distribution e¤ect can produce
complicated patterns.
- E¤ect of j : When j ! 1 the LHS of (3.14) tends to zero but the RHS tends to
r, thus (3.14) holds. Again this can be explained by saying that in this case the large
productivity of j makes the distribution e¤ect to be nil. When j !
P
k 6=i;j k

=(M 
1) (which is the lower bound in the case we are analyzing) the LHS of (3.14) tends to
a nite number but the RHS tends to innite and thus (3.14) also holds. In this case
what happens is that we get close to the case where M 
P
k 6=i k

=j in which
the necessary condition always holds. Again, the necessary condition may not hold for
intermediate values of j for reasons identical to those explained before.
- E¤ect of
P
k 6=i;j k : When
P
k 6=i;j k ! 0 (3.14) reads
 ii+j
 ii+j +
1 
n
 r(jM + i)
j(M   1) ;
which may or may not hold. In this case we are back to the case of two agents where
the necessary condition may or may not hold, depending on the interplay between i
and j : Finally, when
P
k 6=i;j k ! (M   1)j the LHS of the above inequality tends
to a positive number but the RHS tends to innite and thus the inequality is satised.
The explanation is identical to the case where j !
P
k 6=i;j k

=(M   1). Again,
15
the necessary condition may not hold for intermediate values of
P
k 6=i;j k for reasons
identical to those explained before.
E¤ect of . An increase in  makes the LHS of (3.11) larger. For given values of all
other variables, this makes harder the fulllment of this condition.
The necessary condition yields an upper bound on the degree of meritocracy compatible
with no sabotage. This is very clear when all agents are identical, because the left hand
side of (3.11) simplies to  and the condition gives us the bound directly. Let us work
out the non symmetrical case. Dene
qij 
r(jM + 

i )Pn
k=1 

k
0B@ Pnk=1 k
jM  
P
k 6=i
k
1CA : (3.15)
Now, condition (3.11) can be written as
(
iPn
k=1 k
+ qij(
1
n
  iPn
k=1 k
))  qij
n
: (3.16)
Notice that for some agents, iPn
k=1 k
< qij(
iPn
k=1 k
  1n) and so (3.16) holds for any
. However, at least, for all agents whose productivity is less than the average -i.e.
1
n  iPnk=1 k - the left hand side of (3.16) is positive and thus it can be written as
 
qij
n
iPn
k=1 k
+ qij(
1
n   iPnk=1 k )
: (3.17)
Let S be the set of agents for whom iPn
k=1 k
> qij(
iPn
k=1 k
  1n) . For any i 2 S dene
ij 
qij
n
iPn
k=1 k
+ qij(
1
n   iPnk=1 k )
; (3.18)
and let i  minj 6=i ij : Then, the maximum degree of meritocracy compatible with
no sabotage is min(1;mini2S i): By Proposition 2 for each agent i the most restrictive
bound if the one towards the most productive agent, that is, ai = in for all i =
1; :::; n  1; and n = n(n 1): Furthermore, notice that for each agent i, ij < 1 if and
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only if qij < 1: Otherwise, any degree of meritocracy is compatible with no sabotage.
In our discussion on the e¤ect of  we have proved that q(n 1)n is increasing in ; by
(3.18) as  decreases the maximum degree of meritocracy compatible with no sabotage
decreases. The most favorable case for meritocracy is the case of perfect substitutes
inputs ( = 1). In this case,
qij  r(jM + i)
jM  
P
k 6=i
k
;
which is less than one if and only if
r <
jM  
P
k 6=i
k
jM + i
:
In the Cobb-Douglas case, it is easily calculated that
lim
!0
qij =
1
n
r (M + 1)
0B@ Pnk=1 k
jM  
P
k 6=i
k
1CA ;
which is less than one if and only if
r <
n(jM  
P
k 6=i
k)
(M + 1)
Pn
k=1 k
:
4. A Su¢ cient Condition for No Sabotage.
In this section we study under what conditions a Nash equilibrium with no sabotage
exists. To make the problem tractable, we assume that the individuals input is given
by
R(li; l i) = max(T  
X
j 6=i
lij  K
X
j 6=i
lji; 0); (4.1)
Ri(li; l i) = iR(li; l i); i 2 f1; ::; ng
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Where the parameter K is a positive constant. Notice that in this case, if agent i uses
one unit of labor time to sabotage the input of agent j; he reduces his input in one unit
and the input of agent j in K units. Thus,
 
@R(li;l i)
@lij
@R(li;l i)
@lPi
= K for all (li; l i) such that T  
X
j 6=i
lij  K
X
j 6=i
lji  0:
Next lemma simplies the search for an equilibrium without sabotage because it
characterize the best response of i when the rest of agents is not sabotaging anyone.
Lemma 1. Let li = (li1; :::; lii 1; lii+1; ::; lin) be a best response for agent i to l i = 0;
then if j  k; and lij > 0; Rk(li; l i)  Rj(li; l i) and consequently lik  lij :
Proof. Notice rst that if li is a best response to l i = 0; then T   Klij  0 for
all j: Suppose not, that is, suppose that there is an agent j such that T   Klij < 0:
Then agent i can decrease the time dedicated to sabotaging agent j up to a point
such that T  Kl0ij = 0: Thus agent i will increase her input without a¤ecting the in-
put of the other agents, which implies that she will be better o¤ and will contradict
that li is a best response against l i = 0: Suppose that Rk(li; l i) > Rj(li; l i); let
l^i be such that l^il = lil for all l 6= j; k; l^ij = lij   "j ; l^ik = lik + "k where "k > 0;
"j > 0, k"k = j"j and l^ij  0: Thus, Rk(li; l i) + Rj(li; l i) = Rk(l^i; l i) + Rj(l^i; l i)
and Ri(l^i; l i) > Ri(li; l i);which implies that si(l^i; l i)  si(li; l i); so the share of
this agent does not decrease. Finally, let us see that the production increases. Re-
call that f(R1; ::; Rn) = F (
Pn
j=1  (Rj)) with  homogeneous of degree   1. We
distinguish two cases. First, suppose that  > 0: In this case  is increasing and con-
cave, thus  (Ri(l^i; l i)) >  (Ri(li; l i));  (Rk(li; l i))  (Rk(l^i; l i))   (Rj(l^i; l i) 
 (Rj(li; l i); and since f is strictly increasing in all its arguments, F is strictly increasing
in
Pn
j=1  (Rj); therefore f(R1(l^i; l i); ::; Rn(l^i; l i)) > f(R1(li; l i); ::; Rn(li; l i)): Sec-
ondly, suppose that  < 0: In this case  is decreasing and convex, thus  (Ri(l^i; l i)) <
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 (Ri(li; l i));  (Rk(li; l i))  (Rk(l^i; l i))   (Rj(l^i; l i)  (Rj(li; l i); and since f is
strictly increasing in all its arguments, F is strictly decreasing in
Pn
j=1  (Rj); therefore
f(R1(l^i; l i); ::; Rn(l^i; l i)) > f(R1(li; l i); ::; Rn(li; l i)): In both cases the production
increases which implies that i(l^i; l i) > i(li; l i):
Lemma 1 implies that if an agent is not sabotaging the most productive agent, he
is not sabotaging anyone.
In the last section we proved that if M 
P
k 6=i k

=j for all i; j, the necessary
condition for no sabotage holds: Notice that, given our assumption on the individuals
input, M = K: The next Proposition shows that if K 
P
k 6=i k

=j for all i; j, zero
sabotage is a Nash equilibrium. The intuition is that since the damage that agents can
inict on each other is small, sabotage does not pay o¤.
Proposition 3. Assume K 
P
k 6=i k

=j for all i; j: Then lij = 0 for all i; j 2
f1; ::; ng is a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Let us see that for each agent i the best response to l i = 0 is li = 0:
Suppose on the contrary that the best response to l i = 0 involves positive sabotage by
agent i. Let li = (li1; :::; lii 1; lii+1; ::; lin) be such that lij > 0 for some j: By Lemma 1,
lin > 0:Dene Rlj  jR(li; 0) for all agent j; and let Rl the vector of inputs evaluated
at the point (li; 0); that is, Rl = (Rl1; :::; R
l
n):
As we have shown in the proof of Lemma 1, T  Klij  0 for all j: Let us see rst that
there is at least one agent j such that T  Klij > 0: Suppose not, then T  
P
j 6=i lij =
T   T (n   1)=K: Since K 
P
k 6=i k

=j for all i; j; K  n   1; which implies that
T   T (n   1)=K  0: Thus Rli = 0: But this can not be the best response of agent i
to l i = 0: Since nothing is produced, the payo¤ of this agent is zero. By reducing the
sabotage activities he will get a positive payo¤. Therefore
P
j 6=iR
l
j > 0: Finally, let
us see that for all li such that
P
j 6=iR
l
j > 0;
@i(li;0)
@lin
< 0; and thus lin = 0, which by
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Lemma 1 implies that lij = 0 for all j: By the denition of i,
@i(li; 0)
@lin
=
@si(R
l)
@lin
f(Rl) + si(R
l)
@f(Rl)
@lin
:
From (4.1) we have that @Rn(li;0)@lin =  Kn; and
@Ri(li;0)
@lin
=  i: Since the production
function is strictly increasing in all its arguments, it follows that
@f(Rl)
@lin
=  @f(R
l)
@Rn
Kn   @f(R
l)
@Ri
i < 0:
Thus, in order to see that @i(li;0)@lin < 0; it is enough to show that
@si(R
l)
@lin
=  @si(R
l)
@Rn
Kn   @si(R
l)
@Ri
i  0. (4.2)
If the sharing rule is constant, the above inequality always holds. It also holds if li is
such that Rli = 0; because since sharing rules are homogeneous of degree cero,
@si(R
l)
@Ri
Rli +
@si(R
l)
@Rn
X
j 6=i
Rlj = 0;
and since
P
j 6=iR
l
j > 0;
@si(R
l)
@Rn
= 0: For all other li such that Rli > 0; proving that
inequality (4.2) holds, is equivalent to prove that
 
@si(R
l)
@Ri
@si(Rl)
@Rn
 Kn
i
:
Since the sharing rule is homogeneous of degree cero,
 
@si(R
l)
@Ri
@si(Rl)
@Rn
=
P
j 6=iRj(li; 0)
Ri(li; 0)
=
T
P
j 6=i j  K
P
j 6=i jlij
i(T  
P
j 6=i lij)
:
Notice that, since K 
P
k 6=i k

=j for all i; j;
P
j 6=i j  Kn; and by the order of
the agents, j  n: Thus,
T
P
j 6=i j  K
P
j 6=i jlij
i(T  
P
j 6=i lij)
 nK(T  
P
j 6=i lij)
i(T  
P
j 6=i lij)
=
nK
i
;
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as we wanted to prove.
The previous equilibrium is not always unique. If
P
k 6=i k

=j  K  i=j for
all i; j (in particular K  1), there are, at least, two kinds of Nash equilibria additional
to that with no sabotage:
I) In the rst kind, no positive output is produced. This equilibrium can be sustained
with the following strategies: For each i, lii+1 = T ( modulo n) and lij = 0 otherwise.
Clearly Ri(li; l i) = 0 for all i: It is also clear that no agent can deviate protably.
II) In the second kind (only possible if n > 2), only one agent produces a positive input.
This equilibrium can be sustained with the following strategies: For each i 6= n, let
lii+1 = T (modulo n  1) and lij = 0 otherwise, lni = 0 for all i. Clearly Ri(li; l i) = 0
for all i 6= n; and Rn(li; l i) > 0: It is also clear that no agent can deviate protably.
However when K < i=j for all i; j, we can guarantee uniqueness of equilibrium.
Proposition 4. Assume K < i=j for all i; j: Then lij = 0 for all i; j 2 f1; ::; ng is
the unique Nash equilibrium.
Proof. The proof is left to the Appendix.
Let us now consider the case when the possibilities of destruction are large, i.e.
K >
P
k 6=i k

=j : In contrast with the previous case, the necessary condition is no
longer su¢ cient.
Example 3. If in Example 2 we set n = 4; T = 10; M = 5;  = 0:5; r = 1=3;  = 1;
1 = 2 = 3 = 4; the necessary condition holds, but in this case no sabotage is not
an equilibrium: the payo¤ of agent i in the point of zero sabotage is i(0; 0) = 0:854
but, for li = (2; 2; 2); i(li; 0) = 0:992: So an increase in sabotage activities pays o¤.
The problem in this case is that the share of an agent can increase with sabotage,
contrary to what happened when K 
P
k 6=i k

=j ; (see 4.2). To guarantee that
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zero is a Nash equilibrium this e¤ect can not compensate the fall in output caused by
sabotage. The following assumption just formalizes this.
A1: For each agent i; let l = (li; l i) with l i = 0; 0  lij  TK ; for all j 6= i: Let
Rli = i

T  Pk 6=i lik ; Rlk = k (T  Klik) ; and Rl = (Rl1; :::; Rln): Then,
 @si(R
l)
@Rn
Rli
si(Rl)
<
@f(Rl)
@Ri
Rli
f(Rl)

n
i

K + 1

i
Kn
: (4.3)
A1 is similar to the necessary condition but stronger on two counts. On the one
hand it is evaluated not only in the point of zero sabotage but in all points described
above. On the other hand it is a little bit more restrictive since in the point of cero
sabotage and by the homogeneity of the sharing rule,
 @si(R
0)
@Rn
=
@si(R
0)
@Ri
iP
k 6=i k
:
Thus, this su¢ cient condition in the point of cero sabotage reads:
@si(R
0)
@Ri
R0i
si(R0)
<
@f(R0)
@Ri
R0i
f(R0)

n
i

K + 1
 P
k 6=i k
Kn
;
and since P
k 6=i k
Kn

P
k 6=i k
Kn  
P
k 6=i k
;
this condition is stronger than the necessary condition (3.2).
We are now prepared to state and prove our next result.
Proposition 5. Assume A1; and K >
P
k 6=i k

=j , for all j: Then lij = 0 for all
i; j 2 f1; ::; ng is a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Let us see that for each agent i the best response to l i = 0 is li = 0:
Suppose on the contrary that the best response to l i = 0 involves positive sabotage by
agent i. Let li = (li1; :::; lii 1; lii+1; ::; lin) be such that lij > 0 for some j: By Lemma 1,
lin > 0, lin  lij and T  Klij  0 for all j:
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Dene Rlj  jR(li; 0) for all agent j; and let Rl the vector of inputs evaluated at the
point (li; 0); that is, Rl = (Rl1; :::; R
l
n): Let us see that
@i(li;0)
@lin
< 0; for all (li; 0); then
lin = 0; which, by Lemma 1 implies that lij = 0 for all j: By the denition of i
@i(li; 0)
@lin
= i

f(Rl)( @si(R
l)
@Rn
K
n
i
  @si(R
l)
@Ri
) + si(R
l)( @f(R
l)
@Rn
K
n
i
  @f(R
l)
@Ri
)

:
(4.4)
The assumed form of the production function implies that
@f(Rl)
@Rn
=
@F (yl)
@y
 0(Rln); where y =
nX
k=1
 (Rk): (4.5)
Since  is homogeneous of degree   1;  0 is homogeneous of degree    1, hence
 0(Rln) =  
0(n(T  Klin)) =  1n  0(T  Klin): Notice that since K >
P
k 6=i k

=j
for all i; j; K > n   1; Thus, T  Pk 6=i lik  T   (n   1)lin > T  Klin: Given that f
is strictly increasing in all its arguments, if   0;  0 is decreasing and @F (yl)@y  0; if
 < 0;  0 is increasing and @F (y
l)
@y  0: In any of these cases,
@F (yl)
@y
 1n  
0(T  Klin)  @F (y
l)
@y
 1n  
0(T  
X
k 6=i
lik); (4.6)
thus multiplying and dividing the right hand side of 4.6 we have that,
@f(Rl)
@Rn


n
i
 1 @f(Rl)
@Ri
; (4.7)
which implies that
 @f(R
l)
@Rn
K
n
i
  @f(R
l)
@Ri
 @f(R
l)
@Ri
( K

n
i

  1): (4.8)
Since @si(R
l)
@Ri
 0;
 @si(R
l)
@Rn
K
n
i
  @si(R
l)
@Ri
  @si(R
l)
@Rn
K
n
i
: (4.9)
By A1, (4.8), (4.9), and (4.4), @i(li;0)@lin < 0; as we wanted to prove.
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5. Conclusions
In this paper we have presented a model of cooperative production where agents can
sabotage other agents inputs. We have derived necessary and su¢ cient conditions
to avoid sabotage in a Nash equilibrium. These conditions point out to factors like
the technology of the rm, the relative productivity of agents, the relative capability of
agents between sabotage and productive activities and the degree of meritocracy. These
ndings can be used on several counts: To help our understanding of how and why an
organization populated by rational agents might be self-destructive (see Genicot and
Skaperdas [2002] for a similar point in a model of conict). To explain why cooperatives
tend to o¤er egalitarian incentive schemes (Kremer [1997] and Priks [2005] and the
references there). Or to the design of sharing rules that do not encourage sabotage but
are meritocratic.
Our results have been obtained under a number of simplifying assumptions. Thus,
it is a fair question to ask what would happen if some of these assumptions are removed.
Let us comment on this focussing our attention on two issues: the form of the sharing
rules and the assumption that the quantity of leisure is not a choice variable.8
1. More General Sharing Rules: We may consider sharing rules of the form
si(R1; ::; Rn) = s(Ri;
Pn
k=1 g(Rk)) where g is a non decreasing and concave function.
This would allow for sharing rules like si(R1; ::; Rn) =
(Ri)
Pn
k=1(Rk)
 ;  2 [0; 1]: Unfortu-
nately, the su¢ cient conditions considered in this paper for preventing the existence of
an equilibrium with sabotage do not work in this case, even if all agents are identical.
For instance, when K < i=j ; there might be equilibria with and without sabotage (see
Beviá and Corchón (2003), Example 1) and, in some cases, even if K <
P
k 6=i k

=j ;
only equilibria with sabotage exists (see Beviá and Corchón (2003), Example 2).
8Other possible extensions are repeated interaction or the consideration of actions like stealing,
defending against sabotage or giving information that could damage other peoples inputs.
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2. Variable Working Time: In this paper we assume that the length of the
working time is exogenously given. How di¤erent is the case where agents can decide
the length of working time from the case analyzed in this paper? Clearly, the necessary
condition for no sabotage still holds, because any working time has to be distributed
optimally between productive and sabotage activities. But in this new framework no
sabotage is not necessarily a socially optimal choice: Sharing rules that do not encourage
sabotage may also not encourage a high level of e¤ort (e. g. the egalitarian rule). Thus,
in some cases, social optimality may require choosing a sharing rule which encourages
both e¤ort and sabotage. In consequence, a model with a variable working time requires
a considerable departure from the methods developed in this paper that are based in
that no sabotage is always socially optimal. This extension should be subject of further
research.
25
6. Appendix.
Lemma 2. Let n > 2; k  n 2 < n 1  n with k = 1; ::; n   3; and let h() =
(r(nM + 

n 1))=
Pn
k=1 

k: The function h is increasing in  and goes to cero when 
goes to minus innity.
Proof. First of all notice that the function h can be written as a function of the
relative productivities of all agents with respect to the productivity of agent n  1;
h() =
r(( nn 1 )
M + 1)Pn
k=1(
k
n 1 )

:
Since n 2 < n 1; (n 2=n 1) ! 1 as  !  1: Thus h() ! 0 as  !  1:
Finally, let us see that h0() > 0:
h0() = r
Pn
k=1(
k
n 1 )
M( nn 1 )
 ln( nn 1 )  (( nn 1 )M + 1)
Pn
k=1(
k
n 1 )
 ln( kn 1 )Pn
k=1(
k
n 1 )

2 :
The numerator can be written as:
(
n
n 1
) ln(
n
n 1
)
 
nX
k=1
(
k
n 1
)M   ( n
n 1
)M   1
!
 

(
n
n 1
)M + 1
 n 1X
k=1
(
k
n 1
) ln(
k
n 1
):
First notice that 
(
n
n 1
)M + 1
 n 1X
k=1
(
k
n 1
) ln(
k
n 1
) < 0
because for all k = 1; :::; n   1; ln( kn 1 )  0 and since n 2 < n 1; ln(n 2n 1 ) < 0.
Secondly,
nX
k=1
(
k
n 1
)M   ( n
n 1
)M   1 =
n 2X
k=1
(
k
n 1
)M +M   1 > 0
because M >
P
k 6=n 1 k
n
> 1: Therefore h0() > 0:
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Proof of Proposition 2.
Suppose we have an equilibrium with positive sabotage, (l1; :::; ln); and let
RS = (R1(li; l i); :::; Rn(li; l i)): Then,
Step 1. There is at least one agent i such that
Pn
j=1;j 6=i lji  T:
Suppose that for all agent i;
Pn
j=1;j 6=i lji > T: Then, if we sum for all agents,P
i
Pn
j=1;j 6=i lji > nT; but this is impossible since, because of the time constraint, for
all j;
Pn
i=1;i6=j lji  T:
Step 2. There is at least one agent i such that Ri(li; l i) > 0:
Suppose that, for all agent j , Rj(li; l i) = 0: Then j(li; l i) = 0 for all j: By Step
1 we know that there is an agent i such that
Pn
j=1;j 6=i lji  T . Since K < i=j ;
and Ri(li; l i) = 0; the amount of time devoted to sabotage activities by this agent i is
strictly positive. But this can not be an equilibrium. If this agent reduces her sabotage
activities, the total output will be positive and her input positive. Consequently, she
will get a positive amount. Therefore, she will be better o¤.
Step 3. There are at least two agents, i and j; such that Ri(li; l i) 6= Rj(li; l i).
Suppose on the contrary that for all i; and j; Ri(li; l i) = Rj(li; l i). By the as-
sumptions on the sharing rule, i(li; l i) = 1nf(R1(li; l i); ::; Rn(li; l i)): Suppose agent
i reduces her sabotage activity toward agent j zero, let l^i denote the new strategy
for agent i: In this case, the input of agent i will increase by ilij and the input
of agent j will increase by Kjlij : Since K < i=j ; and the rest of agents are not
a¤ected, Ri(l^i; l i) > Rj(l^i; l i) > Rk(l^i; l i) for all k =2 fi; jg: Thus, i(l^i; l i) 
1
nf(R1(l^i; l i); ::; Rn(l^i; l i)) >
1
nf(R1(li; l i); ::; Rn(li; l i)); which implies that agent i
is better o¤.
Step 4. If Rj(li; l i)  Ri(li; l i)  Rk(li; l i); and T  K
P
j 6=i lji > 0; then lik = 0
and lij = 0:
Suppose rst that lik > 0: Since total output is decreasing in lik; let us see that this can
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not be an equilibrium because the share of this agent is non increasing in lik: That is,
 @si(R
S)
@Rk
Kk   @si(R
S)
@Ri
i  0.
If the sharing rule is constant (the egalitarian sharing rule), the above inequality always
holds. If it is not, to prove the above inequality is equivalent to prove that
 
@si(R
S)
@Ri
@si(RS)
@Rk
 Kk
i
:
Since the sharing rule is homogeneous of degree cero and K < i=k,
 
@si(R
S)
@Ri
@si(RS)
@Rj
=
P
j 6=iRj(li; l i)
Ri(li; l i)
 Rk(li; l i)
Ri(li; l i)
 1 > Kk
i
:
Thus, lik = 0:
Suppose secondly that lij > 0: Notice rst that if T  
P
k 6=j ljk K
P
k 6=j lkj < 0; lij > 0
can not be an equilibrium, because agent i can decrease the time dedicated to sabotaging
agent j without a¤ecting the input of agent j but increasing her input and total output,
which implies that she will be better o¤. Thus T  Pj 6=k lkj  KPj 6=k ljk  0. Since
total output is decreasing in lij ; let us see that this can not be an equilibrium because
the share of this agent is non increasing in lij : That is,
 @si(R
S)
@Rj
Kj   @si(R
S)
@Ri
i  0.
If the sharing rule is constant (the egalitarian sharing rule), the above inequality always
holds. If it is not, to prove the above inequality is equivalent to prove that
 
@si(R
S)
@Ri
@si(RS)
@Rj
 Kj
i
:
Since the sharing rule is homogeneous of degree cero and K < i=j ,
 
@si(R
S)
@Ri
@si(RS)
@Rj
=
P
j 6=iRj(li; l i)
Ri(li; l i)
 Rk(li; l i)
Ri(li; l i)
 1 > Kj
i
:
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Thus, lij = 0:
Step 5. For all agent i, T  KPj 6=i lji > 0:
Suppose on the contrary that there are k agents such that T  KPj 6=i lji  0: Suppose
that these agents are the rst k agents. By Step 4, these agents do not su¤er sabotage
from agents k + 1 to n: Thus T  K Pkj=1;j 6=i lji  0 for all i = 1; :::; k: Adding these
inequalities for i = 1; ::; k; we get: kT   KPki=1Pkj=1;j 6=i lji  0: But, by the time
constraint,
Pk
i=1;i6=j lji  T; and since K < 1; kT  K
Pk
i=1
Pk
j=1;j 6=i lji > 0:
Step 6. There is not an equilibrium with positive sabotage. By the previous steps, we
know that for all agent i except the one with the biggest input, and for all j; lij = 0:
Thus, if there is an equilibrium with positive sabotage, only the agent with the biggest
input is using part of her time in sabotage activities. But, by Proposition 3 the best
response to cero sabotage by others is cero sabotage.
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